SPATIAL EQUILIBRIUM MODELING WITH IMPERFECTLY COMPETITIVE MARKETS: AN APPLICATION TO RICE TRADE by Chen, Chi-Chung et al.
  1 
 
Spatial Equilibrium Modeling with Imperfectly Competitive Markets: 






Department of Agricultural Economics 
National Chung-Hsing University 
Taichung, Taiwan, ROC 
Email: mayjune@nchu.edu.tw 
Tel: +886 - 4-22858137 
Fax: +886 - 4-22860255 
 
Bruce A. McCarl 
Professor 
Department of Agricultural Economics 
Texas A&M University 
College Station, TX, USA 
Email: mccarl@tamu.edu 




Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taiwan, ROC 
Email: Emily@econ.sinica.edu.tw 
Tel: +886- 2-2782 2791 ext 201 
Also Professor 
Department of Agricultural Economics 




Department of Agricultural Economics 
National Taiwan University, Taiwan, ROC 
Email: m577@ccms.ntu.edu.tw 
Tel: +886-2-2365 6329 
 
Paper accepted for presentation at AAEA Annual Meeting, Long Beach, CA, July 28-31, 
2002.  Copyright 2002 by Chi-Chung Chen, Bruce A. McCarl, Ching-Cheng Chang, and 
Shih-Hsun Hsu.  All rights reserved.  Readers may make verbatim copies of this 
document for non-commercial purposes by any means, provided that this copyright notice 
appears on all such copies. 
 Spatial Equilibrium Modeling with Imperfectly Competitive Markets: 




  A general imperfect competition spatial equilibrium model is developed to estimate 
the trading country behaviors in the international rice market using a conjectural variation 
approach.    Such a model allows the possibility of an imperfect competitive market to exit 
on both the export and import sides without any assumption of market structure.  The 
empirical results show that the major exporting countries, Thailand, Vietnam, and the U.S. 
acted as high degree of imperfect competitors(or oligopolies) while Pakistan acted as a 
lower degree of imperfect competitor.  The importing countries such as Japan, the 
Philippines, Europe, Brazil, and the former USSR behaved as high degree of imperfect 
competitors (or oligopsonies).  The empirical results also show that there are welfare 
gains of $1,492 million when all trading countries comply with the free trade agreement.   1 
 
Spatial Equilibrium Modeling with Imperfectly Competitive Markets: 
An Application to Rice Trade 
 
I. Introduction 
Spatial equilibrium (SE) models (Samuelson, Takayama and Judge) have long been 
applied to international trade analyses in agriculture.  They are usually operated under a 
perfect competition assumption.  However, such an assumption is not always acceptable 
since imperfectly competitive market behavior is thought to exist in a number of instances.   
For instance, investigations of the international wheat market have generated results that 
infer imperfectly competitive behavior in the form of a U.S.-Canada duopoly (McCalla); 
U.S.-Canada-Australia triopoly (Alaouze, Watson, and Sturgess); European Economic 
Community (EEC)-Japan duopsony (Carter and Schmitz). 
Quantitative approaches to trade modeling have been developed to either examine or 
simulate trade under imperfect competition.  International grain markets and trader 
behavior have been investigated in many studies using econometric tools or non-spatial 
approaches.  McCalla; Alaouze et al.; Paarlberg and Phillip; and Carter and Schmitz 
focused on the international wheat market while Karp and Perloff studied in the rice export 
market and Karp and McCalla investigated the international corn market.  These studies 
found that the international grain markets existed as imperfect competitive markets.   
  Several papers have dealt with imperfect competition treatment in SE models.  
Nelson and McCarl developed Cournot and conjectural variation based models which 
could depict certain forms of imperfect market structures, but they did not apply them 
empirically.  Kolstad and Burris developed a SE model for wheat incorporating 
reaction-functions from oligopolies/oligopsonies, but focused only on cases like duopsony, 
duopoly and triopoly.  Kawaguchi, Suzuki, and Kaiser used the conjectural variation   2 
 
approach, similar to that used in Nelson and McCarl, and applied it to the Japanese 
domestic milk market. 
   All these studies using spatial or non-spatial approaches generally assumed some 
particular market structures and examined how closely the model results compared with 
actual data to identify which market structure is able to explain the observed trade pattern.   
For example, Karp and Perloff assumed that China, Thailand, and Pakistan were either 
acting as price-takers, in coalition with each other, or behaving like Cournot-Nash players 
in their rice export market.  Kolstad and Burris assumed the international wheat market 
was behaved as if it were the result of traders acting under either a duopsony, duopoly, or 
triopoly structure.  Such assumptions may bias the results as a more flexible market 
structure assumption may be in order.  In this paper, we wish to explore more flexible 
assumptions in the context of the world rice market.  More specifically, we develop a 
calibration procedure to measure the imperfect degree of trader behavior under a flexible 
market structure specification allowing competitive behavior spanning from perfect 
competition to monopoly or monopsony.  To do so, a conjectural variation approach 
without any restriction is used to best fit trader behavior in an effort to reproduce observed 
trade flows.  After calibration, the model can be used to assess the effects of a free trade 
regime on welfare distributions among the trading countries. 
  Our analytical model also extends the literature in two directions.  In particular, 
previous imperfect competition models are limited because they 
1.  generally focus on either the import or the export market.  For instance, McCalla 
and Alaouze et al. focus on the behavior of wheat exporters, while Carter and 
Schmitz examine wheat importers.  We will calibrate both market groups to a   3 
 
consistent equilibrium data set at the same time in the context of rice. 
2.  generally deal with the major trading countries excluding the other smaller players. 
Such a treatment is not suitable in the rice market, as a small trading country such as 
China may produce a large quantity to fulfill its self-sufficiency target.  Therefore, 
we will look at a wide variety of market participants in the context of rice. 
In Section 2, we argue that the international rice market may be characterized by 
strategic regimes undertaken by the governments to protect the market share of their 
domestic producers.  Section 3 describes the major players in the global rice market.  
The model used in this paper is presented in Section 4.  It is a spatial equilibrium model 
with imperfect competition based on the work of Nelson and McCarl and Kawaguchi, 
Suzuki, and Kaiser.    Our focus is to measure the effect of government intervention on the 
strategic interaction among the importers and exporters.  The results are discussed in 
Section 5.  It is found that most rice trading countries behaved as imperfect competitors.  
The welfare implications of a free trade regime are also simulated.  The paper concludes 
in Section 6. 
II. Imperfect Competition and Strategic Trade Policies 
National and international interests are not always in accord over the trade policy.    A 
trading country has incentive to set-up either a tariff protection or an export 
subsidy/promotion program to maximize its own national interests at the expense of the 
international interests. For instance, Enke (1944) shows that an economy would benefit 
more from imports if the importing country acts as a monopsonist by adopting a tariff duty. 
Although competition is allowed amongst the consumers and producers within each 
country, the government is assumed to act as the guardian to national interests and be very   4 
 
conscious about discriminating against foreign producers for certain commodities, and 
therefore, acts as a monopsonist. Nevertheless, absence of free trade imposes an 
international burden. Therefore, the international interest demands free trade policies 
irrespective of the monopsony or monopoly position of individual nations. 
On the other hand, the idea that imperfect competition might call for policy 
intervention has been recognized by many distortion literature as introduced by Bhagwati, 
Ramaswami and Srinicasan(1969).  Brander and Spencer (1984) argue that the imperfect 
competitive environment provides a simple explanation of why a government might 
impose tariff on foreign products.    The Brander and Spencer’s approach provides support 
for the assertion that governments could raise national income at other countries’ expense 
by supporting national forms in international competition.  Krugman (1984) and Shaked 
and Sutton (1984) also point out that under the imperfect competitive environment the role 
of a tariff is to divert profits from the importers to domestic producers and to the 
government treasury.  As for the export subsidy policy, Brander and Spencer (1985) 
found that the terms of trade move against the subsidizing country whose welfare can be 
increased because, with imperfect competition, price exceeds the marginal cost of exports 
leading to a net increase in profit to offset the adverse terms of trade effects. 
  From the modeling perspective, trading country behaviors with the associate market 
structures could be cataloged into three type of policy groups: Free Trade, Trade 
Restriction, and Trade Extension.    Free trade implies a price-taker behavior which reflects 
a perfect competition market.  Trade restriction includes both an optimal import tariff 
exits in an importing country and a collusive or an imperfect competition among exporting 
countries which indicates that an oligopoly (or oligopsony) market exits. Trade extension   5 
 
represents another type of oligopoly (or oligopsony) behaviors which distort the marketing 
price.  Such three type catalogs of trade policy could be indicated by the value of 
conjectural variation(C.V.) since the value of the conjectural variation could reflect the 
degree of monopoly power as well as the behavior of treading country.     
Following Hwang and Mai, four different equilibria could be obtained according to 
the value of C.V.  The Cournot-Equilibrium is obtained if the C.V. is closed to 0.  The 
equilibrium solution is more collusive than the Cournot one if the C.V. is positive but it 
will be a collusive equilibrium if C.V. is 1. If the C.V. is a negative, the equilibrium 
solution is more competitive than the Cournot one but it will be a perfect competition 
equilibrium while the C.V. is closed to -1.    However, if the C.V. goes to a more negative, 
it indicates that the exporting price is higher than importing price.  Such equilibrium 
implies that there exists a domestic or trade subsidy in an exporter. 
Throughout the world, agricultural trade impediments are more complex than 
nonagricultural trade barriers, underscoring an urgent need for reform where the greatest 
distortions exist.  The goal of food security will be more attainable through a concerted 
effort than through the efforts of individual nations pursuing separate programs aimed at 
food self-sufficiency. 
III.    The Global Rice Market 
The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and International Rice Research 
Institute (IRRI) statistics show that total rice production increased more than two fold 
during the past four decades (i.e., from 215 million metric tons in 1961 to 573 million in 
1997).  Asian countries produce 91-92% of the world total, with China and India 
accounting for more than 50%.  On the demand side, more than 90% is consumed in   6 
 
Asia, with China, India and Indonesia accounting for 75%.  Per capita consumption 
levels are declining in the high-income Asian countries but rapid low-income country 
population growth is causing increasing Asian-wide rice consumption. IRRI (1997) 
projects world annual rough rice production will have to increase by almost 56 percent 
over the next 30 years to keep up with the increasing demand. 
The amount of rice traded in the world market increased from 8 million metric tons 
(mt) in the 60’s to about 20 million mt in the 90’s.  Nevertheless, only 4 to 6% of total 
world production is traded annually.    The balance between consumption and production 
in conjunction with yield increases has made rice trade a residual market, which largely 
occurs when excess rice is available. Government interventions to enhance 
self-sufficiency are also important causes of this residual and occasional market 
(Siamwalla and Haykin, 1983).  Such a market characteristic raises search costs.  
However, for regular buyers the prevalence of strong quality preferences plays an 
important role in determining the trade patterns and market shares (Yumkella, Unnevehr 
and Garcia, 1994).    The pervasive trade distorting policies further exacerbate the market 
rigidity by variety and quality (Cramer, Wailes and Shui, 1993). 
There have been some changes in the trading patterns in rice since the 60’s.  
Import shifted away from Asia to the Middle East, Africa and Latin America, as many 
South and Southeast Asian importers increased their production.  China has converted 
from a rice exporter into an importer while India did the reverse during the 90’s.    But the 
total import volume in most Asian countries remains relatively unstable. 
Thailand, Vietnam, U.S., India, and Pakistan are major export countries.  They 
export 80% of world volume.  The increasing dominance of these five exporters   7 
 
indicates they may be able to exercise market power, but evidence regarding the degree of 
competition is mixed.    Karp and Perloff (1989) found that the rice export market is close 
to price taking, whereas Yumkella, Unnevehr and Garcia (1994) found 
non-competitiveness in high-quality rice exported by the U.S. and Thailand. 
  On the other hand, the competitiveness in the import markets has not received any 
attention.    Rice import markets are characterized by substantial trade barriers with import 
quotas, tariffs, and bilateral agreements being prevalent along with deficiency payments, 
input subsidies and currency overvaluation (Cramer, Wailes and Shui, 1993).  After the 
Uruguay Round, trade liberalization has opened some international rice markets.   
However, most imports are controlled by either the government or agricultural 
cooperatives who are trying to maintain self-sufficiency.  Therefore,  the  perfect 
competition model may not be adequate to depict these strategic trade policies carried out 
by the governments. 
IV.    Imperfect Competition and Spatial Equilibrium Model 
  In this paper, a generalized spatial equilibrium model is developed to accommodate 
any degree of imperfect competition for both importers and exporters.  Imperfect 
competition will be incorporated relying on the conjectural variations approach as in 
Nelson and McCarl and Kawaguchi, Suzuki, and Kaiser.  Conjectural variations (CV) 
capture the information about competitive behavior in a single parameter.  Although CV 
has been criticized for lack of a rigorous justification, it is analytically more convenient 
and no superior alternative exists as argued by Karikari. 
  Suppose there are m exporting and n importing countries.    The inverse excess supply 
function for exporter i, i=1, ... , m, is assumed to be linear and defined as     8 
 
i i i i E d c P + = ,                                             ( 1 )    
where E i and  Pi  are the volume exported and export prices and ci, di are the intercept and 
slope of the inverse excess supply curve for the exporting country respectively.    Similarly, 
the inverse excess demand function in importing country j, j=1, ... , n, is   
j j j j M b a P + = ,                                            ( 2 )  
where Mj and Pj  are the import quantity and price, respectively, and a j and b j are the 
corresponding intercept and slope of the inverse excess demand curve for the importing 
country. 
  Suppose there exist positive trade between all exporting and importing countries.  
Let Xij denote the volume shipped from exporting country i to importing country j. The 
following equations hold at the equilibrium point:   




i ij M X E X , .                                ( 3 )  
Suppose the exporting countries exert market power through government 
intervention while maximizing their profit.  The objective function for the exporting 
country i is 
∑∑ − + − − =
jj
ij ij i i i i ij j j j i X t X E E d c X M b a MAX
ij
) 5 . 0 ( ) ( :π            ( 4 )  
where t ij is the transportation cost per unit.  The first term in  i π  represents total trade 
revenue generated from selling to the importing county, while the second term represents 
the cost of the sales which is defined as the area under the excess supply curve.    The last 
term is the transportation cost. 
  As commonly done in imperfect trade analysis, the optimal trade quantities will arise   9 
 
from the simultaneous solution of the first-order conditions for (4) as follows: 
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∂ '   in equation (5) following Varian is the conjectural variation for exporting 
country i, and indicates that the expected change in the i’
th country’s export to country j 
due to changes in the volume exported by country i into importing country j. 
  Similar equations can be derived for the importing countries.    Suppose the importing 
country j maximizes consumers’ surplus (or net trade surplus) while exercising her market 
power. The objective function is as follows: 




i i i j j j j j X t X X E d c M M b a MAX
ij
) ( ) 5 . 0 ( :φ .           ( 6 )  
The first term in  j φ represents the area under the importing country’s excess demand curve, 
while the second and third terms represent the cost of acquiring imports and transportation. 
The first-order conditions associated with the importer’s decision are: 
. , , 0 ) 1 (













































∂ '   in equation (7) is the conjectural variation for importing country j, which 
gives the change in trade to country j’ from exporting country i caused by a change in the 
amount imported by importing country j from exporting country i. 
  The conjectural variations in equations (5) and (7) reflect the trading country’s   10 
 






∂ '  in equation (5) is 
negative one, then the price difference will be equal to transportation cost, which implies 
that exporting country i  is a price-taker.  Otherwise, the price difference will be the 












, which could be defined as 
the price mark-up (or market rent). 
  The conjectural variations in Nelson and McCarl and Kawaguchi, Suzuki, and 
Kaiser’s models are assumed to be constants.  This assumption implies a specific type of 
marketing structure or a specific trading behavior.  We follow the same assumption on 
this parameter.   Combing the two first order conditions [i.e., (5) and (7)], the profit and 
net surplus maximization problem for all importers and exporters can be re-specified as a 
net social payoff maximization problem adjusted for imperfect competitive markets.    The 
model can be specified as follows: 
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where Aij is the conjectural variation for exporting country i when selling to country j 
telling how other exporters selling to country j react to changes in country i’s export sales. 
The term Bij is the conjectural variation for importing country j when buying from country 





























In this objective function, the first and second terms calculate the areas under the 
excess demand curves minus the areas under the excess supply curves while the third term 
subtracts the transport costs.  Collectively, these three terms follow those from the 
classical spatial equilibrium model (Takayama and Judge) and represent trade under 
perfect competition (or free trade).    The fourth and fifth terms incorporate the conjectural 
variations and represent, respectively, the exporting and importing market rents due to 
imperfect competition. 
  Optimizing yields the following Kuhn-Tucker conditions when trade activity exits 
() () 0 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( = + − + − − + − − =
∂
∂
ij ij i ij ij j ij i i i j j j
ij
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X
ω
.   (9) 
Substituting in price terms, equation (9) can be re-written as     
0 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( = + − + − − − ij ij i ij ij j ij i j X B d X A b t P P ,                      ( 1 0 )  
where  j P  is the import price for importing country j and  i P  is the export price for 
exporting country i. 
  A wide varieties of market behavior can be reflected through the conjectural variation 
terms:  ij A  and  ij B .  If both equal -1, then exporter i and importer j would be acting as 
perfect competitors as in the Takayama and Judge model.  If  ij A  equals zero while  ij B  
equals -1, then exporting country i acts as an imperfect competitor who will not change her 
exports in response to i’s action in a Cournot-Nash context while importer j behaves as a 
price-taker.  
  If the exporter’s conjectural variation is positive and importer’s conjectural variation   12 
 
-1, then it implies that collusion or cooperation exists among exporting countries.  For 














' ' ,                            ( 1 1 )  
then the whole world acts as a perfectly discriminating monopolist against importer j.  On 
the other hand, if the exporter
’s conjectural variation is smaller than -1, it implies that a 
subsidy policy exists so that the exporting price is higher than the importing price.  
Similar statements can be made on the import side. 
  Finally, if the exporter and importer’s conjectural variations are not simultaneously 
equal to -1, then both markets are imperfectly competitive.  This indicates that an 
exporting country i’s market rent is  ] ) 1 ( [ ij ij j X A b + , while an importing country j’s market 
rent is  ] ) 1 ( [ ij ij j X B d + .  
  A calibration procedure is employed to develop values for the conjectural variations 
which are reflective of the market structures behind the data set.    The procedure involves 
an initialization phase where initial values for the conjectural variations are computed 
based on the wedge between prices in trading countries.  Subsequently, there is a 
refinement procedure which adjusts the estimates to make a better fit between the observed 
data and the model solution.    Specifically the procedure involves the following steps: 
Step 1:   Break the countries into importers and exporters.  Obtain trade flow data and 
border prices.    For each pair of countries which have nonzero trade, determine 
the party likely to have market power. 
Step  2:   Calculate an initial estimate of the conjectural variations. The first-order   13 
 
conditions in equation (10) can be solved for either  ij A  or  ij B  if  one  assumes 
the other is -1 and has data for the prices.  For instance, by assuming the 







The numerator is the price wedge between the countries above the transport 






 if the importer has 
the market power. 
Step 3:   Solve the spatial equilibrium model using the conjectural variation estimates 
( ij A  and  ij B ) from step 2 and the observed quantities traded ( ij X ). 
Step 4(Refinement):    For each pair of potentially trading countries 
a)  Compute the percentage deviation between the optimal trade flows and 
observed trade flows.  If the absolute value of this deviation is below a 
tolerance level, the optimal trade flow is obtained and go to step 4(c).  
Otherwise, go to step 4(b). 
b)  Recompute the conjectural variations.  We numerically adjust them 
based on the sign and size of the deviation in 4(a).  A positive deviation 
implies that the conjectural variation is underestimated.    For instance, an 
underestimated import tariff could allow more trade to occur. Therefore, 
the value of conjectural variations are increased to reduce the trade 
quantity.  A negative deviation implies that the conjectural variation is 
overestimated and the CV is reduced.   
c)  Continue until all pairs are completed.       14 
 
Step 5:    If any conjectural variation be adjusted, go to step 3. 
Step 6:  Terminate because all the conjectural variations have been adjusted so that the 
optimal trade flow converges with the actual data. 
  The basic nature of this iterative approach looks for imperfectly competitive market 
structure between pairs of trade partners by attributing the wedge between prices in excess 
of the transport costs to a conjectural variation.    In reality, this wedge could be caused by 
government interventions through its domestic or trade policies. 
V. Application to Rice Markets 
  This model will be applied to the world rice market.  The rice data including trade 
quantities and values in year 1995 are from FAO Trade Yearbook. The elasticities of export 
supply and import demand come from Cramer et al.  The transportation costs among 
trading regions is calculated as the distance of trading regions times the shipping rate for 
typical ship size from Fellin and Fuller.    A list of all trading regions is shown in Appendix 
A. 
  For model calibration, a comparison between observed and model generated trade 
flow and prices are given in Table 1.  It shows that the percentage differences for most 
trading regions are below 10% except for Bangladesh. 
  The strategic behavior of a trading country can be examined by looking at the size of 
the estimated CV, which are shown in Tables 2 to 3.    Table 2 are the values of CV for rice 
exporting countries with respect to their importers, while Table 3 are the C.V. values of 
importing countries with respect to their exporters.  Overall speaking, we find most 
markets have highly imperfect competitive participants as their C.V. diverge from negative 
one.    The only exceptions are Pakistan, Indonesia, and Africa.   15 
 
Four classes of market behavior are defined in table 4 based on the estimated CV.    A 
country or region exhibiting an estimated conjectural variation is close to -1 is labeled as 
perfectly competitive. One with an estimated CV higher than -1 but smaller than 0, is 
labeled as a Cournot-equilibrium trader. One exhibiting a positive CV is labeled as a highly 
oligopolisitc trader. An estimated CV smaller than -1, indicates that the exporting price is 
higher than importing price. Such situation implies that there exists a domestic or trade 
subsidy in an exporter which is referred as a trade subsidizer. 
  The C.V.’s of the two major exporting countries (Table 2), Thailand and the U.S., 
range from -0.75 to -2.40.  This result indicates that the two exporting countries exercise 
certain type of subsidy programs which include the export subsidy and domestic subsidy to 
encourage rice export.  For instance, Wailes et al. mentioned that “Thailand, however, 
maintains several programs that benefit manufactured products or processed agricultural 
products and that may constitute export subsidy.  These programs include subsidized 
credit on some government-to-government sales of Thai rice; preferential financing for 
exporters in the form of packing credits; tax certificates for rebates of packing credits and 
rebates of taxes and import duties for products intended for re-export.” (Wailes et al., p. 
15).  Similarly, the U.S. had farm program subsidies from 1974 to 1995.  Brander and 
Spencer found that an export subsidy may improve welfare compared with a free trade in 
an imperfect competitive market in which trading countries play a Cournot game (Carter 
and MacLaren).  Thus, these subsidy policies led Thailand and the U.S. to act as 
imperfect competitors in the rice market. 
  At least 70 percent of Australia rice production is exported. Although her export 
quantity occupies one quarter of Japan’s rice imports, we find that Australia acts as a   16 
 
price-taker in a Japan’s import market.  However, Australia acts as imperfect competitor 
with C.V.’s ranging from -1.72 to 14.06 when she trades with Indonesia and other Pacific 
countries.  This appears top arise due to currency exchange characteristics(Wailes et al.).   
When the exporting country currency is under-valued, the trade impacts will be like that of 
an export subsidy policy. 
  The C.V. found for Vietnam ranges from 3.59 to 5.10 indicating Vietnam acts as a 
highly oligopolistic country with respect to her importers.    It also reveals that the price is 
highly distorted in the market between Vietnam and her trading partners, which may be 
accomplished through the complex licensing system.  Pakistan is found to act as a price 
taker which is consistent with Karp and Perloff’s earlier findings.  Other exporting 
countries, such as Taiwan, India, and Myanmar, also act as highly oligopolistic imperfect 
competitors.    Therefore, the prices in these markets are highly distorted as well.   
  The C.V.’s for the importers are listed in Table 3.  The results show that Africa, 
Bangladesh, and Indonesia are all price-takers.  However, Japan, Europe, the former 
USSR, Brazil, and the Phillippines act as highly oligopsonistic imperfect competitors.  
Japan has maintained high domestic price supports and tight import restrictions on rice 
import.  The producer subsidy equivalence (PSE) for rice is nearly 90 percent of output 
values in 1991-93 (Hayami and Godo).  Similarly, the EU impose high levies on rice 
import because high production costs make their rice uncompetitive in most markets 
(Childs).  Their C.V.’s range from 13.4 to 14.2. 
  Finally, it is interesting to evaluate the costs of the imperfect competition.  A free 
trade model is simulated when both the exporters’ and importers’ conjectural variations are 
equal to -1.  A $1,492 million gain is globally possible where importers gain $1,098   17 
 
million (or 74% in total ) and exporters $394 million(Table 5).   
VI. Concluding Comments 
  This paper developed a general spatial equilibrium model which incorporates 
imperfect competition based on a conjectural variations approach.  The procedure does 
not make a priori assumptions on competitive behavior.  It can handle many counties at 
once including importers and exporters as well as small countries.    In addition, both trade 
restrictions, such as import tariffs and trade expansions such as export subsidies can be 
captured by the conjectural variation terms.     
  The procedure was applied to the international rice market.  Most rice trading 
countries were found to behave as imperfect competitors.  The total welfare gain will be 
$1,491 million without any government intervention.   18 
 
Table 1.    Model Calibration to Observed Data 



















I.  Importers          
   China  1851101  1784104  3.76  261.58  264.00  -0.92 
   Indonesia  3288034  3530297  -6.86  285.37  280.34  1.79 
   Japan  19564  18335  6.71  758.94  771.35  -1.61 
   Korea  DPR  674770  731172  -  7.71  240.76  229.35  4.97 
   Korea  REP  288  240  7.28  476.56  497.26  -4.16 
   Philippines  304479  294347  3.44  311.55  314.20  -0.84 
   Other  Asia  5248108  5377512  -2.41  406.46  400.43  1.51 
   Other  N&C  1568183  1569571  -0.09  334.75  334.58  0.05 
   Europe  1164886  1096053  6.28  589.49  612.48  -3.75 
   Former  USSR  263440  262506  0.36  344.01  344.32  -0.09 
   Bangladesh  100105  908934  -88.99  311.51  170.97  82.20 
   Brazil  944895  957075  -1.27  380.82  379.60  0.32 
   Africa  4154434  4148294  0.15  295.02  295.21  -0.07 
TOTAL 19582287  20678200  -5.29       
II.  Exporters         
   Taiwan  188495  185690  1.51  213.92  212.75  0.55 
   India  4972379  5512300  -  9.79  225.77  235.99  -4.33 
   Myanmar  399974  391590  2.14  192.34  191.53  0.42 
   Pakistan  1895017  1852200  2.31  276.47  249.88  10.64 
   Thailand  5738435  6197920  -7.41  290.51  314.92  -7.75 
   Vietnam  2294304  2297200  -0.13  191.37  191.49  -0.06 
   USA  2763176  2859270  -  3.36  312.36  323.17  -3.34 
   Other  S.Amer  790683  865880  -8.68  363.38  370.04  -1.80 
   Australia  539737  510850  5.65  427.18  397.65  7.43 
TOTAL 19582200  20672900  -5.27       
Note: Numbers in the observed data are the import data reported in FAO times 1.118 in order 
to balance with total export in 1995 FAO statistics. 
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Taiwan India  Myanmar  Pakistan  Thailand 
Importing Country 
Bangladesh      -2.02  -1.53 
China 27.55    23.63  -1.11  -1.29 
Indonesia  36.67 0.38 29.35 -0.59 -1.40 
Japan   0.38  -0.97  -1.00 
Korea DRP        -1.12  -1.09 
Korea REP        -0.99  -1.01 
Philippines  0.38    -1.01 
Other  Asia    0.38 30.58 0.58 -0.75 
Other  N&C  0.38  -0.75  -1.02 
Europe 26.81  0.38    -0.49  -0.88 
Former  USSR   0.38  -0.89  -1.00 
Brazil       -0.94 
Africa  30.95 0.38 26.12 -0.50 -1.22 
Exporting 
Country 




Bangladesh  -2.35      
China 4.17  -1.95    -9.14   
Indonesia 5.10  -2.40   -14.06   
Japan   -1.16  -0.93   
Korea  REP   -1.17      
Philippines 3.59  -1.22       
Other  Asia  5.31 -0.78 -1.95 -1.72   
Other  N&C    -1.18 -2.52 -2.45   
Europe 3.88  -0.91    0.03   
Former  USSR   -1.18      
Brazil 4.09  -1.04  -1.96     
Africa  4.41 -1.79 -5.64 -8.95   
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Taiwan   -0.06  -0.99         
India     -0.62  2411.94      2.06 
Myanmar   0.21  -0.82         
Pakistan -0.41  -0.12  -1.03  939.57  -1.11  10312   
Thailand -1.23  -0.81  -1.04  1342.74  -1.11  20516  2.06 
Vietnam   0.75  -0.52        2.06 
USA -1.23  -1.11  -1.04  1101.07    13931  2.06 
Other S.Amer               
Australia   -1.11  -1.04  913.20       
Importing 
Country 




Brazil Africa  
Exporting Country 
Taiwan     14.22      -0.96   
India 1.29  -0.52  13.40  5.66    -0.43   
Myanmar 0.17       -0.80   
Pakistan -0.16  -0.41  13.90  6.07    -0.99   
Thailand 0.05  -0.52  13.40  6.34  2.09  -1.00   
Vietnam 0.68    13.40    1.34  -0.57   
USA -0.12  -0.52  13.40  5.66  1.68  -1.00   
Other S.Amer  -0.19  -0.52      1.43  -1.00   
Australia -0.20  -0.52      -1.00   
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Table 4.    Trading Country Behavior in the International Rice Market 
 


















































Table 5.    Welfare Comparison with and without Free Trade 
 




Gain by Free Trade 
(million dollars) 
    Importers  4765.01  5862.60  1097.59 
    Exporters  2694.14  3088.54  394.40 
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Appendix A.    Trade region definition in a spatial equilibrium model 
 





Korea DRP  Korea DRP 
Korea REP  Korea REP 
Philippines Philippines 
Other  Asia  Afghanistan, Cambodia, Iran, Iraq, Lao, 
PDR, Malaysia, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Turkey, 
other Asia 
Other N&C Amer.  Costa  Rica,  Cuba,  Dominican,  Mexico, 
Panama, other N&C America 
Europe  Italy, Portugal, Spain, other Europe 
Former USSR  Former USSR 
Brazil Brazil 
Africa Africa 
Exporting Regions  Countries 
   Taiwan  Taiwan 
   India  India 
   Myanmar  Myanmar 
   Pakistan  Pakistan 
   Thailand  Thailand 
   Vietnam  Vietnam 
   USA  USA 
   Other  South  America  Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, 
Peru, Surinam, Uruguay, Venezuela, other 
South America 
   Australia  Australia 
 
 